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Fairness: Effect on Temporary and 
Equilibrium Prices in Posted-Offer Markets 
Robert Franciosi, Praveen Kujal, Roland Miche/itsch, 
Venzan L. Smith, and Gang Deng 
lo The Problem 
A. Backgrollnd 
Survey studies of attitudes toward pricing in retai! markets (Kahneman 
et al., 19H6, hereafter KKT: 1987) have reported that respondents do not 
consider it fair for a firm to increase prices and profits when there is 
a short-run change in the economic environment that is not justified 
by a cost increase. For example, the following hypothetícal circumstances 
are posed (KKT, p. 201): "Ouestion 1. A hardware store has been 
selling snow shovels for $15. The morning after él Iarge snowstorm 
the store raises the price to $20. PIcase rate this action as: Completely 
Fair --- Acceptable --- Unfair --- Very Unfair ---." 
Eighty-two percent of respone!ents rate this action as unfair or very 
unfair. What is fairness'? This question is not addressed by KKT. In the 
light of our data, and relatee! !iterature, we return to the issue of ínter-
preting fairness in Section V. 
Okun (198 L p. 170) had ear!ier argued that fairness considerations 
explain why firms operate with hacklogs in periods of shortages (e.g., 
automobiles) ane! why sports tickets are often no! pricecl to clear the 
market. Okun ami others have argued that such ínstances of fair hehav-
ior by firms constitute actions which are in their long-run profit-
maxímizing interest: the social rules of fairness define the terms of an 
imp!icit contract that is enforced by virtue of punishment of unfair price 
behavior. l But KKT (p. 2(1) argue that in many situations people report 
1 Our il1\cstigation 01' the pricing 01' basketball tickets at the Univcrsity 01' Arizona is con-
sistent \\ith a rational implicit contract intcrpretation. Historical holders 01' season tickets 
who rene\V each ycar have an cntitlcmcnt lo continllc renc\Val. Thev pav $262 per ticket 
plus a reljuired '"contriblltion'" (tax deductiblc) 01' $100 to the Wildcat Clllh. New tickets 
(notmanv beco!l1c available each )'ear through re1ease: a recent auction 01' entitlcments 
I'or t\Vo tickets broughl $13.500 in a bankruptcv settlcment) are priced undcr se\eral 
options dcsigncd to clear that markct. '[\\0 01' thcm are: (1) buy each )ear a loge season 
ticket for football for $1 AOO-$ umo and get lhe right to a basketball ticket for $362 
(including the contribution) and (2) buv an'"entitle!l1e'"nt with a $5.0()() conlribution lo the 
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that they would follow fair policies in the absence of enforcement 
through punishment. Thus people report that they would leave restau-
rant tips (about 15%) even in cities they did not expect to visit again." 
Respondents also report that they expect automobile repairmen to treat 
tourists and regular eustomers alike in spite of the differing possibilities 
for long-term punishment strategies (KKT pp. 212-13). 
These considerations lead to the proposition that markets in which a 
flrm makes pricing decisions that affect customers (e.g .. posted prices in 
retail markets) will fail to clear if excess demand is not justifled by 
increases in supplier costs (KKT p. 213). This is because of the principie 
of dual entitlements. under which customers have a right to the terms of 
a reference transaction. while the firm has a right to its reference proflt 
(Zajac, 19R5. pp. 139-41). Recent posted prices can serve to define the 
reference transaction (KKT, pp. 201-12). But people do adapt: "Psycho-
logical studies of adaption suggest that any stable state of affairs tends 
to become accepted eventually. at least in the sense that alternatives to 
it no longer come to mind. Terms of exchange that are initially seen as 
unfair may in time acquire the status of a reference transaction ... they 
adapt their views of fairness to the norms of actual behavior" (KKT, p. 
203). These considerations imply that the short-run price response to 
excess demand will be sluggish in markets in which a price increase is 
not justified by an increase in unit supply cost; if the excess demand per-
sists, only new higher prices are sustainable, and people will adapt by 
redefining the reference transaction. Thc equilibrium may still be that 
which is predicted from economic theory. In this chapter we assume that 
Wildcat Cluh. Why is the $100 eonlrihution not included in the ofticial price of the ticket') 
Verv simply. it gives the athletic department more hudget flexihility under state spend-
ing rules. The alhletic departmenl does nol price all tickets to clcar the market to avoid 
a fcared firestorm 01' protesl from the Iegislature. lhe alumni and the communily who 
bought lheir liekels years earlier in loyal support of a less popular haskelhall programo 
Many of these individuals may feel thal they ha ve earned their implicit entillcment eon-
traet. and many eontribute additional money lo university programs. 
Allhough lipping in such silualions has been described by KKT as duc lo a fairness elhic, 
il is imporlanl lo realize thal il is bascd on a widely accepkd expeClalion that tipping is 
an exchange - a pavmenl for sen·ice. The IRS considers tips an exchange and taxes the 
cmployer"s estimate as income. The powerful expectations that drive tipping are clear in 
the following ineident involving one 01' us (Smilh): Ten people go lo a Mexican restau-
ranl al lhe end of a con[erence day. No one Ieaves a tip in lhe belief that with groups 01' 
six or more an automalie 15'10 gratuity is included. The waiter follows the payer inlo the 
parking 101 and demands to know whal was wrong with lhe scrviee'l It was fine. Bul you 
left no tipo Wasn'l a lip included in the bilP No. Forlhwith he is givcn $20. Upon report-
ing, lhis experience in various seminar presentations. other such incidents oI oUlraged 
waiters (blocking the exil dnor) and taxi drivers (hurling eoins at a tlecing cuslorner) are 
brought forward. Clearly, there is a slrong mutual expectalinn lhal service rcquires a 
reward. which is recognized and taxed hy the statc. This is so whether nr nol an exchange 
will be repcaled. 
Prices in Posted-Ofl'er Markets 63 
the hypothesized short-run failure o[ markets to clear depends upon 
buyers knowing that increased profits would result from the higher 
prices. In the absence of such information, buyers do not have a common 
reason for resisting the actions. 
B. Questíon 1 Responses: M{[rket Effects 
In order to better understand the responses to KKTs Question 1, we 
conducted two variations on it. First, we noticcd two features of their 
ljuestion that scemed un usual. It used thc words fáír and a('cep[ab/c 
within thc same instrument, prccluding the possibility that a situation 
might be judged unfair but nonetheless acceptable. Also, questionnaires 
normally allow respondents to register "'No Opinion." Consequently. in 
our first variation of Question l. everything was the same as in KKT 
except that we removed the word faír. asking our respondents to pIe ase 
rate the store's action as: Completely Acceptable (29.7%) Acceptable 
(32.4%) No Opinion (5.4%) Unacceptable (27.0%) Completely Unac-
ceptable (5.4%). For N = 37. our results are shown in the parentheses. 
We get 32.4% who rate the action as Unacceptable or Completely Unac-
ceptable. We use these results as a subject control for introducing a treat-
ment change. Using a different sample ol' respondents from the same 
pool 01' undergraduates. our second variation of Question 1 posed the 
same situation, but added the sentence: "'The store does this to prevent 
a stockout for its regular customers since another store has raised its 
price to $20." Changes in the economic environment have implied con-
sequences in the behavior 01' markets: our purpose was to express the 
sort of market consequence that might reasonably follow such a change. 1 
The issue here is whether the store's response to market competition 
could serve to justify its action (in addition to KKTs postulate that 
people will accept a price increase, relative to a reference transaction. if 
it arises [rom an excess demand that is cost-justified). Our results for N 
= 41 are: Completely Acceptable (34.1 %) Acceptable (39.0%) No 
Opinion (7.3%) Unacceptable (19.5%) Completely Unacceptable (0%). 
, Wh~n markets rail to clcar at below-eljuilibriul11 priccs, bllth buyers ami sellers are hurt 
by the resulting stock-out approach to rationing. Sorne buvers, who would be submar-
ginal at the equilibrium, can profltably buy at the disequilibrium price: this displaces 
intramarginal buvers for whol11 purchasc is more protítable, wíth conscqucnt losses 01' 
buver profit (surplus). In particular. if we postulatc KKTs local stores, one unfair con-
sequence 01' not raising price is that some units are sold to crossover buyers who thereby 
displace sales to neighborhood custorncrs. Ir the store rduses to sell to strangers (besides 
bcing actionable in court), it is vulnerable to the chargc that this is unfair to all who drive 
out of their \Vay to buv at the lowcst cosl. Given a change from the rdcrence baseline, 
all altcrnative policies 'are unfair to some subsct 01' buye~·s. 
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With a market justification the percentage in the last two categories falls 
from 32.4 to 19.5%. 
These data suggest the need for reward-motivated experiments. in a 
posted-offer market setting. to further explore the KKT hypothesis that 
subjects might trade off self-interested behavior against concerns of 
fairness. 
C. Prcviolls Experill1ents 
Kachelmeier et al. (1991 a: hereafter KLS) report laboratory experiments 
designed to measure the eHect of the foregoing fairness considerations 
on actual price responses and convergence behavior in experimental 
markets using huyer posted bid pricing. In their environment. five buyers 
and five sellers trade for ten periods under stationary value/cost condi-
tions. Buyers independently post bid prices. and sellers respond with indi-
vidual sales by accepting bids. Then a change is introduced for a new 
ten-period sequence. In the first sequen ce. sellers are subject to a 50°;;, 
profit tax such that. at the competitive equilibrium price and volume. the 
sellers' share of total surplus is exactly 50%. But in the second sequence 
01' ten trading periods. thc sellers' 50% profit tax is replaced by a 20% 
sales tax on each selter's revenue. The effect 01' this sales tax is to raise 
the previous marginal cost supply schedule. MC(q). to 1.25 MC(q). This 
increases the competitive equilibrium price. lowers the volume. and 
increases the sellers' share of total profit. Each of three different infor-
mation treatment conditions is replicated three times with different sub-
jects (90 subjects total): (1) seller marginal cost information is disc10sed 
to all subjects: (2) the sellers' share 01' aggregate profit (surplus) is dis-
closed to alt subjects: (3) no marginal cost or profit information is dis-
c1osed. With prolit disc1osure. buyers are fully informed that. compared 
with the previous ten reference transactions periods. the change to a sales 
tax re gime has shifted net surplus from buyers to sellers. With marginal 
cost disc1osure. buyers are informed that prices must increase to cover 
the new seller costs. Consequently. profit disc10sure focuses on the KKT 
principie that sellers are only entitled to their previous reference profit 
(it is unfair ror sellers to profit 1'rom the tax). whereas marginal cost dis-
closure reinforces the principie that any price increase is justified by a 
unit cost increase. The treatment with no marginal cost or profit disc1o-
sure provides experimental control. The prediction hypotheses. based on 
KKT. are as follows (KLS. p. 6(7). 
H 1: The initial price response to a change from an income to a sales 
tax will be greater under marginal cost disc10sure than under 
profit disc1osure. 
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Convergence over time relative to the baseline control experiments 
will he 
H2: [aster under marginal cost disclosure: 
H3: slower under protlt disclosure. 
KLS report statistical support for all three hypotheses.~ Our results for 
posted-offer pricing are complctely consistent with those 01' KLS, except 
for some minor dcviations in the eftlcicncy rcsults, which we discuss in 
Section JII. 
D. Ex[cl/sion: Pos[cd Bid VerslIs Pos[cd otlcr 
The institution used by KLS is posted-hid pricing. '"Thc trading rule 
allowcd only buycrs to propose prices" (KLS, p. 700). This was defended 
on the grounds 01' '"intcntional experimental artificiality." That is, sin ce 
fairness dircctly concerns the perceptions and response 01' huyers, this 
device enables direct t11easurement 01' that response in terms of posted 
buying priccs. 
On this note, we propose to examine the robustness of the KLS results 
using the familiar retail inslitution in which sellers post prices lo buyers. 
This institulion is quite clearly Ihe one Ihat KKT have in mind in their 
consumer markel examples (although they do discuss lahor markets in 
which wage bicis are made by lirms). To wit: '"For example, 68 percent 01' 
respondents said they would switch their patronage to a drugstore nve 
minutes further away if the one closer to thel11 raised its prices when él 
competitor was temporarily forced to close .... Retailcrs will have a sub-
stantial incentive to behave fairly ir a large number of customers are pre-
parecl ... lo avoicl doing business with an unfair nrm" (KKT, p. 212). 
Thus, cuslomers will withhold demand fmm an unfair nrm. and, antici-
pating this, the nrm will have an incentive to price 1'airly. In the follow-
ing experiments in which sellers inclependently post prices to the buyers, 
we can study not only huyer clemand withholding behavior but also the 
sellers' indirect attitudcs toward 1'airness as expressed in the prices they 
post to buyers. 01' course, i1' sellers post lower prices under profit disclo-
sure, we cannol know whether it is beca use they are being fair or he cause 
they are simply responding rationally to avoid expectcd punishment by 
buyers. 
We employ the Novanet (Plato) posted-offer mechanism descrihed 
by Ketcham et al. (1984), with the Illodification thar. in the following 
I In a n:lakd studv. Kachélmeier d al. (1')()lh) cxamine Jairness using thc oral doubk-
auction trading rules witil a different experimental dC'oign ami pcrspccti\'e. The hasic 
result. hO\\ é\'cr. a tcndcnc\' Jor the Jaime'os dfcct to dissipatc ()\ er timé. is the salllc. In 
this chaplLr. \\é u'oe the dcsign reportcd in Kl.S (1'll)la). 
¡ 
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....... MC profit tax: -'-'-. marginal values. 
experiments, sellers could nor see each other's prices after independently 
posting them in each periodo This has the effect of reducing the ability 
of sellers to undercut each other's prices (i.e .. by this procedure one 
cxpects to observe a purer and perhaps more persistent individual fair-
ness response, thereby giving the KKT theory its best shot in the experi-
mental market context)o This is not to deny that markcts may be more 
competitive when sellers observe each other's prices. Rather, our point 
is that the reported experiments control for this, and, if the effect of fair-
ness disappears, then under this interpretation we have a stronger result. 
The effect of publicizing price information can always be studied using 
the experiments herein as a comparison control. 
11. Experimental Design 
Essentially. we used the same experimental design as in KLS. The infor-
mation disclosure treatments are identical to those described in Section 
I. Our supply and demand environment, also identical with that of KLS, 
is shown in Figure 4.1 for both the profit tax regime in part one of the 
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experiment, and the sales tax regime in part two. Our design and proce-
dures differed from KLS only in the following respects. 
1. We used six buyers and six sellers, rather than five each. (This 
was to accommodate a second independent follow-on experi-
ment that required 12 subjects.) 
2. Each of the three treatment conditions. parts one and two, were 
replicated four times instead of three times (144 subjects total). 
3. Two control experiments were run for 12 price/purchase periods 
in part one; the others were run for 10 periods. Two profit dis-
closure experiments were run for 20 periods in part two; the 
others were run for 10 periods. The two 10nger profit disclosure 
experiments allowed us to determine if any equilibrating ten-
dencies continued after the first 10 periods. 
4. Between parts one and two of their experiments. KLS scheduled 
a break allowing buyers and sellers to be separated (ostensibly 
to pay them privately) and given the required separate instruc-
tions for the part two. sales tax (no disclosure), regime. We did 
not do this but rather elected to simply pass out different instruc-
tion forms to buyers and to sellers in the control experiment: 
since everyone received papee this disguised the different treat-
ment of sellers. The instructions to buyers simply informed them 
that their redemption values in part two were the same as in part 
one. whereas sellers were told that starting in the next period 
they would paya sales tax rather than a profits tax. Table 4.1 
contains a summary of all handouts for the different informa-
tion treatments which can be compared with the KLS proce-
dures (pp. 691-703, 715-16).5 Subjects earned nontrivial 
amounts of money. Payoffs for the experiments, which lasted 
usually between 2 and 21/, hours. ranged [rom $R.75 to $62.50. 
averaging about $26 ($3,700 total). These payoffs substantially 
exceeded our subjects' usual opportunity costs. For a survey of 
papers that have evaluated the importance o[ monetary rewards. 
see Smith and Walker (J 993b). 
111. Hypotheses and Experimental Results 
HI. In period 1, part two, the first period of trading under the sales 
tax regime. the KKT fairness argument will yield prices ordered 
as follows: 
• AII fmllls ami supplelllcntal inslruclional hanl!ouls are availahlc hy writing lo lhe élulhors 
(Smith). 
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Table 4.1. Handollls for fairness experi/llents 
Control Marginal cost I'rufit 
expcriment disc\usure" disc\osure 
First part uf experiment 
Howa buyer ca\culatcs protít 
How a seller calculates protit 
Explanatiun and graph 01' protit tax 
Form: expected price. actual pricc. sellers' 
share uf profits 
Secllnd part oI experiment 
Notiec: nothing ehangedh 
Noticc: new instructions 
Me disclosure 
Explanation and graph 01' sales tax 
Form: expccted price. actual priec. sellers' 
share 01' profits 
B. buyers: S. sellers. 
B 
Al 
A2 
RI 
s B s 
Al Al Al 
A2 A2 A2 
B2 
R-, 
"Sal11c as control experil11cnt (no disclosure) in tirst par! (JI' cxperiment. 
1, Buyers were inforl11cd that their \'alucs are the same as in part one. 
B 
Al 
A2 
A-, 
..¡ 
Prices (marginal cost disc!osure) > Prices (no disc!osure) > 
Prices (profit disc!osure) 
s 
Al 
A2 
A-, 
..¡ 
H2. By period I (l. part two. the prices under the various treatment 
conditions will be indistinguishable. 
H3. Under the prolit disclosure treatment. the two experimcnts that 
continue for 20 periods in part two will show convergencc to the 
competitive equilibrium. 
The wcighted mean contract pricc (each posted pricc is weighted by 
volume) for the four experimcnts in each information condition is shown 
plotted across all periods in both parts of the experiments in Figure 4.2. 
1 n part t wo. there is initially (period one) a clear separation oC mean 
obscrved prices in accordance with H l. Under marginal cos1. disclosure 
prices jump immediately to the new equilibrium. whereas under profit 
disclosure they do not changc from their previous "refercnce transac-
tion"level. By period 10. the mean price under all three information con-
ditions has converged to near the new competitive equilibrium price 
($2.90). Finally. the two experiments that were extended for 20 periods 
CE 
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33 ,---------------------------------------------------. 
3·2 
3·1 
(b) 
(sa) 2·9 
CE 
2·8 
2·7 
26 
(pr) 25 
2-4 1 L~~3~~5~-L7~~9-L~I~I~~~3~-L5~~7-L-9~-I~I~~13~~1~5~~17~~19~ 
Period 
FIGURE 4.2. Mean contract prices: profit tax and sales tax. (a) •. 
PRe +. PRM: "'. PRP: (b) D. SAe +. SAM: *. SAPo The experiments 
have two stages. With (i) profit tax (pr): (ii) sales tax (sa). (e). control: 
(11/). Me (fi). profit disclosure. 
in part two stabilize at slightly above the competitive equilibrium price 
in periods 11-20. 
We test H l and H2 using the nonparametric Jonckeere test that the 
samples (mean contract prices). of size mJ= 4). are from an a priori 
orc\ering of n(= J) c\istributions against the null alternative that the 
samples come from the same c\istribution. The Jonckeere test is a gen-
eralization of the one-tailec\ Wilcoxon test. For H l. we reject the null 
hypothesis with a test statistic .I 1(J. 4) = 2.J4 (p = .01). For H2. we are 
unable to reject thc null hypothesis . .leO. 4) = -0.4J9 (p = .. 3]). 
In the profit tax regime (part one. periods 1-12. Figure 4.2). although 
prices in all trcatmcnt conditions hover above the competitive equilib-
rium. prices are lowest under protit c\isclosure. The three series come 
together. however. by perioc\ ten. Consequently. even in the baseline 
series. with no reference transaction. initially we observe lower prices 
under protit disclosure. Profit disclosure blunts the profit-seeking behav-
ior 01' sellers relative to the other experiments. But the effect of profit 
disclosure is even more striking under the sales tax regime. given the pre-
vious reference transactions in the baseline. The tendency of the "protit 
disclosure" price path to be below that 01' the "marginal cost'o and "no 
disclosure" treatments is evident. but the control and marginal cost dis-
closure price paths are inc\istinguishable after the f¡rst three periods in 
part two. 
In Table 4.2. we report the frequcncy with which demanc\ is withheld 
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Table 4.2. BlIyer withholding by treatment in fairness experiments 
Withholding 
prorll tax 
Sales tax 
Control 
2 
Me disc!osure 
2 
Protit disclosure 
4 
23" 
"22 of these cases were in experiment SA4P and involved thn:c buyers. 
33 
3·2 
31 
CE 2.9 
28 
26 
25 
Sum 
'i 
27 
24 1 2 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Period 
FIG URE 4.3. Mean posted prices: sales laxo profit disclosure .•. SA 1 P: 
+. SA2P; *. SA3P: D. SA4P. 
(underrevealed) by buyers. This frequency is determined by counting the 
number of instances in which each buyer fails to buy at a price equal to 
or below his/her redemption value. Although the incidence of withhold-
ing. in the profit disc\osure treatment, is far greater in the sales tax regime 
(23) than in the profit tax regime (4). we saw 22 cases in one experiment! 
Furthermore. that experiment yielded mean prices below that of two 
other experiments. This observed withholding was an uncontrolled 
"treatment" variable. It is important to note that the mean posted prices 
in that experiment were not higher than in the other experiments with 
sales tax. On the contrary. in all periods they were lower than in two other 
experiments. and in the first period after the tax change they were the 
lowest of al!. For the detailed price path. see Figure 4.3: the experiment 
in which the withholding occurred is SA4P. lt would appear that the ten-
dency of sellers to post lower prices earlier but not later in the sequence 
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of trading periods was the result of either seller fairness behavior 
or anticipation of strategic buyer withholding, not a response to buyer 
withholding. 
Withholding did not significantly affect efficiencies, mainly beca use 
often (though not always) only marginal units were withheld. However, 
there is one efficiency difference between our experiments and KLS. One 
of their hypotheses was that "Profit information will lead to lower 
volume and lower market cfficiency than in either the cost-disclosure or 
no-disclosure markets" (KLS. p. 6(8), and they reported support for this 
hypothesis. Our data did not support this hypothesis. In only two periods 
(6 and 10) was the average efficiency and the trading volume in the profit 
disclosure experiments the lowest of all treatments. Similarly, we 
observed lower efficiency and trading volume in the marginal cost dis-
closure treatment than did KLS. Minor differences are to be expected 
because the microstructure of the institutions (rules) of trade are differ-
ent. But overall the results reported by KLS are robust with respect to 
the change to posted-offer pricing. 
IV. Discussion 
Economists and econometricians have long allowed that nonmonetary 
and noneconomic factors inftuence behavior, although the standard 
rational model has always be en more prominent. The exceptions are 
implicit in concepts of external economies in consumption. Recent work 
(e.g., KKT) has shown how survey evidence can be used to study sys-
tematically, and categorize, a wide variety of behaviors that may deviate 
from the narrow interpretation of rational self-interested models of equi-
lihrium hehavior. 
In this chapter, we studied the effect of alternative information dis-
closures on the prices posted by sellers subsequent to an exogenous 
increase in seller marginal costs (a sales tax). If, as argued by KKT buyers 
are more receptive to price increases that appear to be cost justified than 
to price increases that increase profits aboye reference transaction levels. 
then, recognizing this, sellers will post lower prices under profit disclo-
sure than under marginal cost disclosure. Over time, however, this dis-
crepancy need not persist because, as KKT argue, actual (equilibrium) 
behavior may allow the estahlishment of a new reference transaction 
that does not violate social norms of fair behavior. Our results support 
this argument. Consequently, the prediction that equilibrium outcomes 
will reflect the rational behavior of standard economic models is sup-
ported, although the transition path to the new equilibrium is affected 
by such fairness considerations. This result is particularly strengthened 
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by the fact that sellers could not see each other's prices. Hence, conver-
gence was not helped by a seller seeing that others were raising prices. 
Our results also support the value of survey data in uncovering poten-
tial anomalies, which can then be tested in the context of motivated deci-
sions to see if the flndings survive in actual behavioL 
According to the NelV York Times (Lohr. 1992), Hurricane Andrew, 
striking South Florida on August 24, 1992, provided a fine example of 
how the KKT fairness considerations are needed to modify economic 
theory. "What happened in the plywood market here after the storm is 
a classic example of fairness constraints at work .... The big companies 
(Home Depot. Georgia Pacific and Louisiana-Pacific) performed far dif-
ferently (increasing the price only about half as much as the 'marker) 
than the price-gougers selling ice, water and lumber 1'rom the back 01' 
pickup trucks at wildly inflated prices in the (¡rst week after the hurri-
cane hit. Classic economic theory, of course, defends these ... " (Lohr, 
1992, p. e2). Actually what classical theory does is to explain, 110t defend. 
the competitive market operated out of the back 01' pickup trucks. In a 
competitive market. those who would attempt to charge low prices would 
stock out more quickly, and thus are under pressure to mise prices. given 
the limited supplies: otherwise. arbitrage profits will be collected by third 
parties. Modern economics, in the form of reputation theory, also 
explains tlle actions of the large tirms who have much greater control 
over their market. Their national sources of supply enable them, through 
transfers. to replenish stocks more quickly. price less aggressively, and 
build a long-term reputation for not "price gouging" (with free adver-
tising, courtesy of the Ncw York Times article) but simultaneously reap 
supra normal profits (they did raise prices, if only half as much as the 
competitive fringe). But one does not need a utilitarian 1'airness ethic to 
explain the repeated game (versus one-shot) nature 01' the long-run 
outlook of large suppliers. Similarly, optimization theory predicts that if 
buyers believe that they can conserve their resources by complaining 
about price gouging being unfair, then they will do it. The long-term 
result (hidden from the average consumer) may aClually build the 
market power of the large firms, reduce competition. and decrease 
welfare: all in the good name 01' fairness. Would a rose by another name 
smell so sweet? 
V. What Is Fairness'! 
We think that the answer to the question What is fairness? is likely to 
depend on the particular context in which fairness is used. In the context 
that we study here, the results are not consistent with the idea that fair-
Prices in Posted-Offer Markets 
ness considerations belong in the utility function, as an externality in con-
sumption that alters in a sustainable way the equilibrium behavior pre-
dicted by the standards own utility maximizing model.h 
We suggest that fairness in our context is best characterized as affect-
ing agcnt expectations, not their utility funetions. Thus, buyers expecting 
(fccling that they have a right to) fair treatment believe that price 
increases resulting from external cost increases should not produce 
higher profits for sellers. Sellers, aeeepting this norm of fair treatmcnt, 
or fearing rctaliation, do not attcmpt initially to '"extraet" higher profit. 
These expeetations yield no change in priees, initially, but sueh priees 
are unsustainable as an equilibrium (i.c .. there is excess demand). In 
the absenee of a utility being [air, sellers gradually do what eomes natu-
rally: They raise prices anc\ finc\ rewards in higher profits. If sellers 
receivec\ utilitarian value from fairness, they would be satisfiec\ with 
lower profit by accepting the profit-fairness trac\e-off. If buyers received 
utilitarian value from fairness, their final equilibrium demanc\ levels 
would not be prec\ietec\ from the moc\cl that maximizes thcir monetary 
reward. By this interpretation, the expectations of both buyers anc\ 
sellers as to what is acceptable or fair changes ovcr time. This also 
explains why fairness dominates the questionnairc responses of subjects. 
Their answers are basec\ upon their expectations, not on the unantici-
pated and unanticipatable adjustments that can occur in the c\ynamics of 
actual market or experimental market behavior. This is beeause no one 
(except the expcrimenter in a market experiment) can anticipate the 
new equilibrium anc\ its possible effeet on transient expectations of 
what is fair. 7 
" To illustrate. suppose that there are two COIll!l1odities. X and /. and that the utility func-
tion for eaeh huyer has the forlll.u(x. ~\1[! 1[,,) = ~ + ([X - (hl2)x' - o:rl(1[ /1[,,) - 1] with 
incollle constraint, r = ; + ¡JX. where p is the price of X in units of Z. Note that. with the 
paramcter a> O. an externalit\ (1[/¡¡¡,) appears in the utility function. where ¡¡¡, is the profit 
01' each seller in a rcfcrence (initial) situation, ,lIld 1[ i,., the corresponding profít in a ne\\ 
situation. lf huyers each !l1axill1i/e 11 suhject to their incnme constraint. this !cads to the 
dell1and cquat¡'on: /1 = a - hx - al (w'¡¡¡,) - 1]. If eaeh seller has quadratic increasing total 
costs. the prolít function (." = output) can he written. 1[ = 1'.1' - (1/2f3).'·'. which at a 
ll1aximull1 yidds the supply function, r = f3fJ. Initially. let a = a" <lnd 1[ = ¡¡¡'o Thcn .1" = r" 
(dcll1and equals supply) implies JI = p" = a" - i>f3J1" ami p" = ([,,!( 1+ !J(3): 1[" = (f3/2)JI,~. ~()\\ 
Iet dCll1and increase with a = al > a". Th':n X, = V, ill1plies the ne\\' equilibriull1. l' = p, = 
a, - /¡f3p, - a[(1[,/¡¡¡,) - IJ, with (1[,/1[,,) = I'l'í'/P,~, Clearly, if a> 0, the externality cquilih-
rium.xl = ."" is distinct froll1 that which \\'ould prevaiL wherc x'j' = V';'. hased on lhe absence 
(Jf the externalitv ((X = O). The pricc and quantity levels to which our experimental data 
cOIl\'Crge 0\ er time correspond to the situation in this exall1ple in which (a = O) (i.e .. the 
reslllts in pan two uf the experiment are prcdicted froll1 the standard O" n-lllaxill1izing 
I1lodcl 01' lItilitv). 
Our expectati,;ns interpretation nf fairness is consistent with the reslllts of Hnllll1an et 
al. (1994) in their ultill1atul11 and dictator ¡lame cxperimcnts, although here the results 
are stronger hecausc there are six (not onc) bargainers on each side 01' the market. Also 
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AIso, questionnaire data summarize average, not marginal, opinion, 
and we know from hundreds of controlled laboratory experiments that 
competitive outcomes and efficiency are driven by marginal analysis 
(sometimes called the marginal trader hypothesis). Thus, in markets like 
the one in Figure 4.1, average MV and average Me are irrelevant to 
determining the equilibrium, where MV(Qc') 2: MC(Qe)' The marginal 
trader hypothesis explains why the Iowa Presidential stock market is a 
much more accurate predictor of the popular vote than opinion polls, 
although the participants pro ve to have, on average, all the standard 
opinion biases established by politica! science and sociologica! studies 
(Forsythe et al., 1992). 
Fehr et al. (1993) provided a different context in which the word fair-
ness is associated with deviations from self-interested behavior. First 
movers (buyers) compete by announcing buying priees (anonymously by 
telephone through an experimenter) to sellers who can accept but not 
make caunter affers. Sellers then chaose a "qua lit y" ar effart level far 
the good they produce; given any accepted price, it is in the sellers' inter-
est to choose low effort but in the buyer-seller joint interest to choose 
high. Buyers do best individually with a low price, if sellers choose high 
effort, but the dominant strategy of sellers is to choose low. Cooperative 
play requires buyers to buy at a high price and to trust sellers to recip-
rocate with a high effort. In this two-stage market game, the gains from 
exchange are maximized by cooperative (rair) behavior not by com-
petitive action in the self interest. The market study reported here is the 
opposite: the gains from exchange are maximized by competition, and 
reduced by fair behavior (unless their is utilitarian compensation from 
fairness ). 
The Fehr et al. (1993) experimental data across pairs and periods 
shows a statistically and economically significant positive relationship 
between price and quality. The results are especially interesting since the 
pairings by the market are not constant through time so that reciprocity 
is diffuse. 
It is not clea!', however, in what sense these results are explained by 
see Binmore et al. (1')')2) who reported Nash hargaining experimenls in which the median 
suhject optimizes in the long run in accordance with tbe tbeory using trial-and-crror 
adjustment processes. "!-Iowever. the suhjects scem lo sce no contradiction hetween such 
optimizing and 'fair' behavior. since lhe median suhject reports as fair pretty much what 
actua1l" happens towards the end of the games he or she played. These results are con-
sistent witb a vilOw that regards bchavior as heing shaped by social norms in the minc1s 
nI' the \Ubjeets. but whieh sces the social norms lhemsclves being dctcrmincd by evolu-
lionary considerations of which lhe subjeets are (mI" dimly aware" (Binmorc et al.. 1<)')2. 
p. 34). 'Illis is consistent with KKT. with the adaptive rcsults in the psychology literature. 
and with lbe results reported in this chaplcr. 
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a (utilitarian?) fairness ethic as opposed to a mutual expectationlrecog-
nition by all parties that individual rewards will deteriorate across time 
if there is not reciprocity (e.g .. better qua lit y for better prices). Parallel 
results have been reported by Berg et al. (1995) in the single play of a 
two-stage dictator game run under double blind conditions (see 
Hoffman et al.. 1994: subjects pairings are anonymous with respect to 
each other and the experimenter who cannot know who made what deci-
sion). In Stage l. subjects in room A choose how much of their $10 
endowment to send to an anonymous counterpart in room B. Each dollar 
sent will be tripled (common knowledge) before it reaches the counter-
part. who. in Stagc II. chooses how much of this tripled amount to pay 
back to the person in room B. The dominant strategy for subjects in room 
A is to keep all the money beca use it is a dominant strategy for any 
money received in room A to be retained. The average amount sent is 
$5.16 with an average payback of $4.66. In a second "social norm"" treat-
ment. all subjects are given a common history: the outcomes from all 
plays in the first treatment. The average sent is now $5.36 with a payback 
of $6.46. 
Berg et al. (1995) do not suggest that their results are due to fairness. 
As they describe it. they are studying trust and reciprocity. Subjects in 
room A can substantially leverage thcir endowments by "investment"· in 
amounts sent to room B. But this requires trust and an expectation of 
reciprocity. They are studying mcchanisms of social exchange and how 
the social norms that support such exchange can emerge from historical 
experience. These mechanisms allow gains from exchange to be captured 
in situations where traclitional economic analysis woulcl suggest market 
failure. Such mechanisms are metarational. and materially extend the 
rational choice paradigm to include the evolution of institutions that 
promote gains from cxchange in situations that are not incentive 
compatible. 
We think the results of our chapter and those of Fehr et al. (1993) and 
of Berg et al. (1995) contribute to a unificd understanding of anomalous 
behavior usually attributed to fairness. The contexts differ in the three 
studies. but the anomalous resuIts are not explained satisfactorily by a 
utilitarian fairness ethic. by expectations that are not sustainable (in our 
study). or by trust coupled with expectations of reciprocity (in the other 
two studics). The common outcomc across the three studies is for sub-
jects to approach the efficient maximization of the social monetary gains 
from exchange. 
